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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the differences in the announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) of commercial banks and non-banks, and explores the influence of bank regulation 
and the financial crisis on such differences. We find that abnormal stock returns on SEO 
announcements for US commercial banks are significantly higher than those of non-banks, 
consistent with the hypothesis that bank regulations reduce the likelihood that bank SEOs 
signal overpriced equity. The propensity score matching-based difference-in-difference 
analysis indicates that the differences in stock returns between banks and non-banks 
decreased during the 2007-09 financial crisis period and increased after the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.  
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1. Introduction 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis triggered extensive debate over the role of bank 
capital in preventing failure. Recent studies on bank capital adequacy find that capital has a 
significant impact on banks’ systemic risk and banks’ performance during financial crises 
(e.g., Gauthier et al., 2012; Acharya et al., 2012; Mehran and Thakor, 2011; Berger and 
Bouwman, 2013; Black and Hazelwood, 2013; Bessler and Kurmann, 2014). Seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs) by banks are generally encouraged by regulators because they believe a 
higher level of capital for individual banks can help sustain a healthy financial system. The 
issuance of new equity by banks, however, gives mixed signals to market participants. New 
equity issuance may demonstrate a bank’s commitment and willingness to comply with 
capital regulation and bank stability (Keeley, 1989), but it may also signal private 
information that a bank raises new equity capital in response to financial difficulties 
(Krishnan et al., 2010).  
A large number of studies explore the announcement effects of SEOs by non-banks 
and find that SEO announcements are related with negative abnormal stock returns (e.g., 
Smith, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988; Hansen, 1989; 
Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Corwin, 2003).2 This pattern is consistent with the signaling model 
of Myers and Majluf (1984) that an SEO announcement signals firm overvaluation. However, 
for banks, the information content of SEO announcements might not be straightforward given 
the banks’ compliance of banking regulations. By examining the difference in the 
announcement effects between commercial banks’ (banks hereafter) and non-banks’ SEOs, 
we intend to discover the different nature of information content in the SEO announcement 
for banks from non-banks, and in particular, the implications of banking regulations in the 
event of bank SEOs. We extend our analysis by investigating how the 2007-09 global 
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financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in 2010 may have influenced this difference. 3  
There are competing and even contradictory hypotheses regarding the difference in 
SEO announcements between banks and non-banks. On one hand, abnormal stock returns 
following bank SEO announcements are expected to be higher than those of non-banks. 
Keeley (1989), for example, argues that bank regulation reduces the information content that 
otherwise would be revealed by a security issuance (in general negative), and consequently 
stock announcement effects might be less negative for bank SEOs than those of non-banks. 
Regulation also limits the freedom and flexibility of bank managers to set the quantity and 
type of capital, and to time security offerings to take advantage of differential information 
between managers and stock market participants.4 Bank SEOs are therefore less likely to be 
considered overvalued by stock market participants than non-bank SEOs due to the lower 
information asymmetry between bank managers and investors.   
In addition, investors might react more positively (i.e., less negatively) to bank SEOs 
relative to non-bank SEOs because higher capital ratio can reduce bank risk given the 
regulation constraints faced by banks. Polonchek et al. (1989) suggest that, unlike non-banks, 
banks are monitored by both the market and a regulator, and bank capital structure decisions 
are constrained by regulation. Regulators impose minimum capital ratios and restrictions on 
the type of securities that qualify for inclusion in these ratios. The capital requirement forces 
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banks to have more of their own capital at risk; they thus have less incentive to invest in high-
return but high-risk projects (Hellmann et al., 2001). Furlong and Keeley (1989) analyse the 
theoretical relation between capital regulation and bank asset risk and find that a higher bank 
capital ratio does not lead value-maximising banks to increase asset risk because more 
stringent capital requirements reduce a bank’s gains from increasing the risk level of its asset 
portfolio. Assuming that overall capital regulation tends to reduce bank risk, investors are 
thus more inclined to build up confidence of bank SEOs than non-bank SEOs.  
Finally, banks are perceived to benefit from the government’s implicit too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) policy. In principle, the government can always close a failing bank as soon as the 
bank becomes insolvent. In practice, however, the number of options available to regulators 
for handling bank insolvency problems decreases with the severity of the problem (e.g., 
Hoggarth et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006; Kaufman, 2015). García-Palacios et al. (2014) also 
argue that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by 
governments is barely credible. Recent empirical evidence shows that potential government 
implicit guarantee for banks has extensive implications on the market participants’ 
perceptions.  For example,  it may lead to lower banks’ cost of funding on expected 
government support (Antzoulatos and Tsoumas, 2014), positive stock market reactions upon 
the announcement of TARP injections (Elyasinai et al., 2014), and higher likelihood of 
having SEOs after receiving Capital Purchase program (CPP) funds (Khan and Vyas, 2015). 
With the perception that banks are less likely to fail under the TBTF policy compared to non-
banks, the market will be less sensitive to information revealed from SEO announcements, 
and hence the market reaction to the announcement of SEOs by banks than non-banks with 
the same characteristics is expected less severe. 
On the other hand, there is a contrasting hypothesis suggesting that abnormal stock 
returns of bank SEO announcements may be lower than those of non-banks. Existing theories 
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suggest that banks may be more opaque than non-banks because of the complex financial 
intermediation and the nature of the underlying assets (Haggard and Howe, 2012; Jones et al., 
2012).5 The higher level of opacity may create difficulty in accurately evaluating bank SEOs 
(Krishnan et al., 2012), leading to a higher perception of overvaluation upon bank SEO 
announcements, and thus lower abnormal stock returns than for non-banks.6 Keeley (1989) 
also argues that an increase in equity reduces the option value of the deposit insurance 
guarantee because banks become less risky, and hence banks’ SEO announcements may lead 
to a larger negative effect.  
To test the validity of the competing hypotheses, we examine 375 SEO 
announcements of US banks and compare their cumulative announcement stock returns 
(CAR) to those of their non-bank counterparts from 1982 to 2012. Our main result supports 
the hypothesis that the announcement effect of banks is less negative than that of non-banks. 
The cumulative abnormal stock returns around the announcement window (-1, 1) for banks 
are -0.96 percent, 0.61 percent higher than that of non-banks. These results hold even after 
controlling for various firm-, issue- and market-specific variables. We further address the 
endogeneity concerns in the OLS regressions by adopting the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method to find the matched sample of non-banks for each bank and our PSM results 
confirm our main finding that the announcement effect is significantly higher for bank SEOs 
than non-bank SEOs.  
We further explore whether the difference in stock returns between banks and non-
banks was influenced by the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010. Because banks were at the 
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center of the financial crisis, the announcement of SEOs at this time may have revealed 
significant negative information to the market. The difference in announcement effects 
between bank and non-bank SEOs may thus be reduced during the financial crisis period. On 
the other hand, the increased capital regulation and information disclosure requirements for 
banks after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 may have led to a decreased level of 
adverse selection costs and thus a positive impact on the announcement effects for bank 
SEOs. The difference in announcement effects between bank and non-bank SEOs is therefore 
expected to have increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. We provide propensity 
score matching-based pairwise difference-in-difference analysis to examine these two 
hypotheses. Our results confirm our expectations, showing that the difference in the 
announcement effects between banks and non-banks indeed decreased during the 2007-09 
financial crisis period, but increased after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We first contribute to the debate 
whether bank regulation could boost investor confidence and reduce firm equity issuing costs. 
Our result that banks have higher SEO announcement effect confirms Slovin et al.’s (1991) 
suggestion that banks are frequent equity issuers due to the low issuing costs. Our finding 
also complements Smith’s (1986) result that utility firms, which operate in a highly regulated 
industry, also experience relatively higher SEO announcement effects than their less 
regulated counterparts. Our study offers credence to the theory that regulation could influence 
investors’ perception of information asymmetry between investors and firm managers. To 
highlight the significance of regulation, we further focus on recent events, such as the 
financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, to explore their impact on the 
difference between bank and non-bank SEO announcement stock returns. We find that 
issuing costs increase during the financial crisis period and decrease when government 
regulation tightens.  
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Our paper also extends the work by Polonchek et al. (1989), who find that the mean 
abnormal stock returns of bank SEO announcements are higher than those of non-bank 
counterparts. The main limitation of Polonchek et al.’s (1989) study, however, is that it 
covers the period 1975-1984, before the adoption of Basel I in 1988 and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. These important regulation 
changes are thought to have had significant effects on the stock market behavior of bank 
SEOs. The 2007-09 financial crisis may also have changed investor perception of firm/bank 
SEO announcements. Their relatively small sample also suggests that their findings are not 
conclusive. For example, there are merely 41 equity event announcements in Polonchek et 
al.’s (1989) study, and the researchers themselves acknowledge that “the sample sizes 
involved in this study are necessarily small” (p. 449). Another recent study on UK rights 
issues between 1988 and 1998 is that by Iqbal (2008) who finds less negative stock market 
reactions in the rights offerings by financial firms compared with industrial firms. However, 
both studies’ findings are based solely on the comparison of the mean values of the 
cumulated abnormal return (CAR) over the SEO announcement windows, and ignore the 
differences in other characteristics between banks and non-banks. These characteristics are 
important in determining the difference in CARs between banks and non-banks. For example, 
banks that issue SEOs are generally larger than non-banks, and the different stock market 
reactions to the announcement of SEOs may simply be caused by the difference in size 
between banks and non-banks.  
Our paper also contributes to the strand of literature that explores determinants of the 
wealth announcement effect of bank SEOs. For example, Wansley and Dhillon (1989) find 
negative stock reaction from the issuance of common stock, the magnitude of which is 
similar to that found in the previous literature for utilities, and smaller than that of industrial 
firms. Keeley (1989) documents more negative announcement stock returns for involuntary 
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bank stock issuances than voluntary ones during the 1975-1986 period, whereas Cornett and 
Tehranian (1994), on the contrary, find that involuntary equity issuance does not convey any 
signal of a firm’s future prospects. Krishnan et al. (2010) find that both undercapitalized and 
well-capitalized banks have a significantly negative mean abnormal return around SEO 
announcements, indicating that investors do not perceive these two types of banks as 
economically different. Our result that the difference in CARs between banks and non-banks 
is significantly reduced over the financial crisis period indicates that it is more costly to issue 
equity for banks in bear markets. Consistent with the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer 
requirements (BIS, 2010), this result implies that banks should preserve sufficient capital 
when an economy are overheated in order to avoid costly SEOs when an economy falls into 
recession. .  
Finally, our paper has implications for the recent growing interest in systemic risk 
literature since the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Capital adequacy of a bank has been 
documented to have a significant impact on its systemic risk and bank failures (Gauthier et al., 
2012; Acharya et al., 2012; Arnold et al., 2012). In particular, Gauthier et al. (2012) show 
that macro prudential capital requirements are positively correlated to future capital raised by 
banks as well as future losses in equity value. Since equity issuance changes the capital ratio 
and the capital structure of a bank, it may have a significant influence on its systemic risk and 
may also have implications for the valuation and risk of its interconnected banks. Our finding 
that the differences in CARs between banks and non-banks are reduced after the passage of 
the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 may also imply that the deregulation in the 
US banking system may have contributed to fuel the increase of systemic risk in the last two 
decades.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology, Section 3 presents our empirical results and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Data and methodology 
 We collect US seasoned equity offerings from the SDC database during the sample 
period from January 1, 1982, to December 31, 2012. We include all offers issued by firms 
listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. We identify the sample using the database of the Centre 
for Research in Security Price (CRSP), with available firm account data from Compustat. We 
compare equity issuances between commercial banks (SIC codes 6000 to 6199) and non-
banks. From the latter group, we exclude issues from other industries that may face regulation 
restrictions such as utilities (SIC codes 4900 to 4999) and non-bank financial firms7 (SIC 
codes 6300-6499, 6200-6299 and 6500-6999). The dataset consists of 3,710 equity issues, out 
of which 375 are issued by banks and the remaining 3,388 are issued by non-banks. Panel A 
of Table 1 shows the number of equity announcements for banks and non-banks. The number 
of observations for banks and non-banks increased significantly after 2000, and the number 
of issuances reached its highest point in 2009-2010. The increase in the equity issuance of 
banks in recent years highlights the significance of new research in this field.   
 We measure the wealth announcement effect of equity offerings following a standard 
event study methodology (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985). We estimate abnormal stock 
returns using the market model as follows:   
, =  , − 	 −  
,+,     (1) 
where , are the stock returns for equity issuance i on day t, and , is the corresponding 
daily stock market returns (S&P 500). The parameters  	  and 
  are calculated over the 
estimation period (-250 and -10 days).  
(−1,1) = 	 + 	  + 	∑ ! " #$!%& +       (2) 
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Eq. (2) explores the relation between announcement stock returns after SEOs for 
banks compared to those for non-banks after controlling for a number of variables that may 
influence such relation. The bank dummy takes a value of 1 for banks, and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent variable (−1,1) is the cumulative abnormal stock returns for firm i between 
days (-1 and 1) around each SEO announcement day (day 0). We use a three-day event 
window around each announcement in order to ensure that we capture the full price effect of 
the SEO announcement, and in untabulated results, we find that our conclusions are robust 
within alternative period estimations and announcement periods (e.g., between -2 and 2 days). 
Over the announcement period, selected stocks must have at least one non-missing daily 
return to be included in our sample.  
We control at Eq. (2) for a number of conventionally used issue-specific, firm-specific 
and market-specific characteristics.8 To capture issue-specific characteristics, we control for 
secondary shares, which are offerings sold by existing shareholders. Secondary shares are 
typically associated with relatively low asymmetric information because issuers of secondary 
offers are older and have a larger book value of assets, sales, cash flow margins and 
proportions of tangible assets (Lee and Masulis, 2009; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Dor, 2003). 
We therefore expect a positive relation between secondary shares and SEO announcement 
effect. We also control for the indicator of Rule 415 shelf registration, which is a dummy 
variable of 1 for issuers under shelf registration rules who can decide to make a SEOs at any 
time within a two-year window and 0 otherwise. Issuers of Rule 415 can make the decision to 
go to the market and sell an issue within minutes, probably during favorable market 
conditions (Autore et al., 2008).9 There is therefore a positive expectation in the relation 
between Rule 415 and issuances’ abnormal stock returns. Finally, we control for each 
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issuance’s proceeds/total assets to control for the magnitude of an equity issuance. According 
to Tan et al. (2002), large equity issuances are expected to be positively related with SEO 
announcement stock returns, since it is more likely that firms issue large equity when there 
are positive investment opportunities available.  
To capture firm-specific characteristics, we use the following control variables. Share 
turnover is measured as a firm’s trading volume divided by the number of outstanding shares, 
and firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. These variables are used to 
capture a firm’s information asymmetry level. According to Corwin (2003), when small firms 
issue new equity, there is a higher level of uncertainty. We therefore expect a positive 
relation between share turnover and firm size with SEO announcement stock returns. We also 
control for the ratio of total equity over total assets. Firms with a lower equity level are 
considered more risky, facing higher expected costs of financial distress. We therefore expect 
a positive relation between equity level and SEO announcement effects. We also control for 
each firm’s stock run-up over the interval period between -60 and -2 days prior to each SEO 
announcement. Lucas and McDonald (1991) argue that if a firm is undervalued, managers are 
more likely to delay issuing new equity to fund an investment project until good news about 
the firm is released. On the contrary, overvalued firms have incentives to issue equity 
immediately. Therefore, the announcement of an equity issued by a firm with high abnormal 
stock returns prior to the announcement is likely to have a more negative price reaction. We 
finally control for a firm’s stock volatility, which is the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns in the interval period between -250 and -10 days prior to each issuance. Since firms 
with high volatility have a higher chance to face financial difficulties (Chang et al., 2004), a 
firm’s volatility is expected to be negatively related to SEO announcement wealth effect. 
Finally, we use stock market volatility and market run-up to control for market 
characteristics. Stock market volatility is used to capture macroeconomic uncertainty in the 
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US market, which is defined as the annualized standard deviation of S&P 500 daily returns in 
the year before the announced equity issuance. Market run-up is defined as the run-up of the 
S&P 500 index in the interval period between -60 and -2 days prior to each announced equity 
issuance. According to Lewis et al. (2003), investor reactions are typically less negative 
following increases in stock market prices, and we therefore expect that SEO abnormal stock 
returns are positively related with market run-up.  
Appendix 1 provides the definition of the variables used in this study. All firm- and 
macroeconomics-specific characteristics included in the regression analysis are measured at 
the fiscal year-end preceding the SEO announcement date.  
 
3. Empirical results  
3.1. Univariate results 
Panel B of Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the key variables used in this 
study for banks and non-bank firms. We find that the equity offerings’ CAR over the window 
(-1, 1) for US banks is, on average, -0.98 percent, which is 0.61 percent higher than that of 
non-banks. The difference in stock returns between banks and non-banks is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with Poloncheck et al. (1989) and 
Wansley and Dhillon (1989), who find that bank-issued equity has a less negative 
announcement effect than that of non-banks, although our findings are driven by a lengthier 
recent period with a significantly larger number of bank equity issuance announcements.  
We further show the statistics of the control variables. We find that secondary shares 
issued by banks are significantly larger than those issued by non-banks. The trading 
frequency of bank-issued equity is less than that of non-bank-issued equity; the share 
turnover is significantly lower. We find that banks are significantly larger than non-banks, the 
average total assets being $32.58 and $2.16 billion, respectively. This difference is not 
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surprising, given that most commercial banks in our sample are listed at the Bank Holding 
Company (BHC) level and tend to be large in size. The proceeds to assets ratio of banks is, 
however, significantly lower than that of non-banks (3.07% and 26.39%, respectively). The 
smaller proceeds ratio may to some extent reflect the significantly larger size of banks. We 
also observe a significantly lower equity/assets ratio for banks. Nevertheless, the 11.85% 
equity ratio is significantly higher than the government-required level, and it may indicate the 
safe conditions of banks that issued equity during the sample period. We further notice that 
the stock run-up of banks (9.39%) is significantly lower than that of non-banks (14.08%). 
Banks may face fewer financial constraints than their non-bank counterparts, and hence, bank 
managers may tend to issue equity when they need it, whereas managers of non-banks may 
have to consider the timing of the issuance to reduce the issuance cost. We find that banks 
have less operational risk than non-banks because banks’ stock volatility is significantly 
lower. In line with Duca et al. (2012), the volatility of banks is higher than that of non-banks, 
indicating that banks face a higher level of debt-related financing costs. The market run-up 
for banks is also significantly higher.  
Figure 1 reports the trend analysis of announcement stock returns over time for banks 
and non-banks. Although we cannot exactly match the same period used by Poloncheck et al. 
(1989),10 we find that banks have a less negative SEO announcement effect relative to non-
banks in the early 1980s. Interestingly, the difference in CARs between banks and non-banks 
increased after 1994. The increased competition by allowing banks to enter new markets after 
the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (Stiroh and 
Strahan, 2003) encouraged banks to voluntarily disclose particularly unfavourable 
information to deter new entry (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990), and/or disclose more quality 
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information on the risks involved to gain reputation from the perspective of customers and 
potential investors (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013).  
This trend, however, is reversed after the passage of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, after which we observe that the difference in CARs between 
banks and non-banks is reduced. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act encouraged banks to 
engage in more diversified business, and the consequent M&A wave among banks led to 
higher industry concentration and reduced competition (Chronopoulos et al., 2015). We also 
find a significant increase of bank CARs relative to non-banks after 2010, when the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was passed. It introduced more 
stringent regulation on capital adequacy and information disclosure as well as consumer 
protection, which led to a decreased level of adverse selection costs for financial institutions’ 
security sales. Overall, Figure 1 demonstrates that while SEOs by banks signal less negative 
information compared to non-banks, the strength of this signal seems to be influenced by the 
stringency of different bank regulations over time.  
 
3.2. Multivariate results 
In this section, we test whether the less negative announcement effects of bank SEOs than 
non-bank SEOs can be explained by firm-, market- and issue-specific characteristics. We run 
Eq. (2) using OLS with White-corrected standard errors (White, 1980). The dependent 
variable is the cumulative stock returns around each SEO announcement (from -1 to 1 day). 
In line with the univariate results, column (1) of the multivariate results in Table 2 shows that 
the bank dummy is significantly positive at the 5% level after controlling for a number of 
variables, with a parameter coefficient equal to 0.617. This result indicates that banks’ 
announcement stock returns of equity issuance are 0.617 percent higher than counterpart 
stock returns experienced by non-banks. This result supports the information hypothesis that 
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bank regulators’ monitoring and disclosure requirements lower the information asymmetry 
between bank managers and investors, therefore reducing the adverse selection problem and 
giving investors more confidence.11 
         The signs of the parameter coefficients for the control variables and the significance 
levels are to a large extent in line with our expectations. For example, in line with Autore et 
al. (2008), we find that issuers of equity under Rule 415 experience a positive stock reaction 
from the offering, because shelf-registered equity has lower underwriting fees, consistent 
with a dominant underwriter competition effect. In line with Lee and Masulis (2009), we find 
that secondary shares have a significant, positive relation with the equity offering effect, 
because issuers of secondary shares face less information asymmetry and adverse selection 
problems with investors. In line with Lucas and McDonald (1991), larger pre-announcement 
stock price run-ups are associated with larger stock price drops following the offering 
announcement. Because overvalued firms may have incentives to issue immediately, equity 
issuances will occur after a period of positive abnormal stock returns to the firm. We also 
find that stock volatility has a negative effect on the equity announcement effect, which is 
consistent with Chang et al. (2004). We also observe that market run-ups tend to be 
positively associated with the stock price reaction to equity announcements. This finding is 
consistent with Lewis et al. (2003), who find that investor reactions are less negative 
following increases in stock market prices. 
 
3.3. Robustness analyses 
We include a number of additional control variables to check the robustness of our 
previous findings. In column (2) of Table 2, we add a dummy variable ‘2007-09 financial 
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need to include the 2007-09 financial crisis dummy variable to examine the impact of the financial crisis on the 
difference in SEO announcement stock returns between bank and non-bank. 
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crisis’, which is equal to 1 if the equity was issued from 2007 to 2009, and 0 otherwise, to 
control for the effect of the 2007-09 financial crisis. We find that the parameter coefficient 
for the 2007-09 financial crisis dummy is significantly negative, indicating that during the 
crisis, stock returns after the issuance of bank equity were more negative than in the rest of 
the sample period. More importantly, the parameter coefficient for bank dummy remains 
significantly positive after controlling for the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
In column (3) of Table 2, we include the firm commitment dummy variable, which 
equals 1 for equity issued as a firm commitment (the entire issue is sold directly to the 
underwriter), and 0 otherwise. Previous research suggests that the issuance of equity with 
firm commitment has lower direct issue costs (underpricing and investment bank 
compensation) than the alternative use of best efforts offering methods (Dunbar, 1998). In a 
firm commitment, the issuing firm is assured of the dollar value of the proceeds of the 
offerings. In the case that the share price of the issuing firm drops, the new shares cannot be 
issued at their issue price, and the underwriter bears an unexpected loss. We find that equity 
issued by the firm commitment method is slightly insignificant (p-value = 0.110) in relation 
to the announcement effect of the equity offering. Our main result, though, holds, with bank-
issued equity having higher abnormal stock returns than equity issued by non-banks after 
controlling for firm commitment.  
 In column (4) of Table 2, we include a dummy variable for capital expenditure, which 
equals 1 if the intended use of the proceeds is for capital expenditure, and 0 otherwise. 
McConnel and Muscarella (1985) argue that if managers follow the market value 
maximization rule, an announcement of an unexpected increase in capital expenditure should 
have a positive effect on the market value of the firm, and vice versa. The positive 
revaluation associated with unexpected capital expenditure increases because the market 
immediately capitalizes on the incremental positive NPV associated with the unexpected 
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projects to be undertaken by the firm. We find that our main results hold, with banks having 
0.647 per cent higher abnormal stock returns after controlling for capital expenditure, 
although we do not find that the use of proceeds has a significant relation with the equity 
offering effect. 
In column (5) of Table 2, we add inverse elasticity to the main regression to measure 
the price pressure. In Gao and Ritter’s (2010) model, the demand elasticity for a stock is 
determined by an order flow inverse to demand elasticity. Inverse elasticity is the natural log 
transformation of the absolute value of daily raw stock returns divided by daily turnover, 
averaged over -250 trading days before the announcement date. The daily order flow inverse 
price elasticity on day t is defined as the ratio between the absolute value of a stock’s raw 
returns and its share turnover. If the stock is listed on NASDAQ, we apply various 
adjustments to the trading volume.12 To reduce the influence of extreme values, we use a 
natural log transformation. A large inverse elasticity reflects a large change in price if there is 
a demand or supply shock, which implies an inelastic demand curve. If a firm issues new 
equity, a more inelastic demand leads to a greater reduction in the stock price. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relation between stock inverse elasticity and the stock reaction to the equity 
offering. We find that the parameter coefficient for inverse elasticity is insignificant, but, 
more importantly, the parameter coefficient of bank remains significantly positive with the 
inclusion of the inverse elasticity variable.  
                                                          
12
 In line with Gao and Ritter (2010), we adjust trading volume for NASDAQ firms. On February 1, 2001, a 
‘riskless principal’ rule went into effect, and according to the director of research of NASDAQ and Frank 
Hathaway, the chief economist of NASDAQ, this resulted in an approximately 10% reduction in reported 
volume. Thus, for February 1, 2001, to December 31, 2001, we divide NASDAQ’s firm trading volume by 1.8. 
In 2002, securities firms began to charge institutional investors commissions on NASDAQ trades rather than 
following the prior practice of merely marking up or down the net price, resulting in a further reduction in the 
reported volume of approximately 10%. Thus, for 2002 and 2003, we divide the NASDAQ volume by 1.6. No 
further adjustment in trading volume for NASDAQ firms is undertaken since 2004.  
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In column (6) of Table 2, we add arbitrage risk instead of inverse elasticity to measure 
the price pressure. Arbitrage risk is the variance of the market model OLS regression 
residuals estimated over the -250 trading days (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). In Wurgler 
and Zhuravskaya’s (2002) model, the demand elasticity for a stock is determined by the 
arbitrage risk. Arbitrageurs keep the demand curve flat if the asset has perfect substitutes and 
the arbitrage risk is 0. By contrast, if the asset does not have perfect substitutes, the demand 
curve is downward sloping because the arbitrage risk is nonzero, and arbitrageurs are risk-
averse. As the arbitrage risk becomes greater, the demand curve becomes more elastic. 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) show that there is a positive relation between arbitrage risk 
and stock returns on the announcement day of S&P 500 additions, which suggests that stocks 
with greater arbitrage risk have less elastic demand. Gao and Ritter (2010) find comparable 
results of arbitrage risk. If a firm issues new equity, a more inelastic demand leads to a 
greater reduction in stock price. We therefore expect a negative relation between stock 
arbitrage risk and stock reaction to the equity offering. Once again, we find that the parameter 
coefficient for arbitrage risk is insignificant, but the abnormal higher stock returns for banks 
than for non-banks are still present.       
 
3.4. Matched sample results  
In this section, we construct a propensity-score matched sample (PSM) by identifying 
for each bank a non-bank with similar characteristics. To accomplish this, we first use the 
propensity score estimations in the probit model using a selection of firm-, issue- and market-
specific variables, which may help to define the differences between banks and non-banks. 
Because banks are on average significantly larger than non-banks, matching a bank with a 
non-bank of a similar size may be biased. For example, a $1 billion sized bank may be 
perceived as small, whereas a $1 billion sized non-bank may be perceived as large. Similarly, 
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because banks are on average more leveraged than non-banks, matching a bank with a non-
bank with a similar leverage ratio may also create bias in the matching. Hence, we classify 
size into deciles within banks and non-banks separately, and restrict the matching process in 
the same deciles. We also match the non-banks in the same decile for the equity-to-assets 
ratio as the corresponding banks. Finally, we restrict the matched non-bank sample from the 
same year to avoid possible biases from time effects. These restrictions can lead to large 
reductions in bias, a design that is analogous to blocking in a randomized experiment. We 
then proceed to find, for each bank, the non-bank with the closest (lowest absolute value) 
difference in the probability estimate, and we do so with replacement. 
We estimate the mean difference in CARs between banks and matched non-banks. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the probit results, and Panel B, the PSM results. Panel A shows 
that, compared to non-banks, when issuing SEOs, banks are more likely to issue a lower ratio 
of proceeds relative to total assets, and that the market volatility and market run-up are both 
higher, less likely to issue secondary issues, and more likely to issue shelf registered issues. 
Panel B shows that the difference in CAR between banks and matched non-banks is 1.53%, 
which is significant at the 1% level, supporting our prior conclusion that banks have higher 
announcement stock returns following SEOs than non-banks.  
 
3.5. The impact of the 2007-09 financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank Act  
In this section, we conduct difference-in-difference analysis to examine the impact of 
the 2007-09 global financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 on the 
difference in the announcement effects between banks and non-banks. The difference in the 
SEO announcement effects between banks and non-banks may be different in this period 
from normal periods in two contrasting ways. On the one hand, the SEOs in a financial crisis 
period, when the market price is low, indicate that the bank is less likely to time the market to 
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issue equity but is rather issuing for true business purposes, including meeting government 
requirements. Investors are therefore less likely to hypothesize that bank equity issuance 
signals information that the bank is overvalued during the financial crisis period compared to 
normal periods. The implication is then that the difference in the announcement effects of 
SEOs between banks and non-banks will increase in the financial crisis period. However, the 
same perception that non-banks may also be less likely to time the market during financial 
crisis may cancel out the effects, leaving the difference unchanged during the financial crisis. 
On the other hand, bank SEOs during the financial crisis period may signal to market 
participants that the bank’s condition has deteriorated, and the market may respond with even 
more negative announcement effects than in normal periods. This effect may be stronger for 
banks than non-banks because banks in general suffered more than non-banks during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. The implication of this argument is that the difference between 
banks and non-banks following SEO announcements is lower during the financial crisis than 
the normal period.  
We take the difference in CARs between banks and matched non-banks using the 
propensity score matching method described in Section 3.4. We then employ the difference-
in-difference (DiD) estimator to examine whether this difference differs between the 2007-09 
financial crisis and the normal period. Table 4 reports the results of two specifications. In the 
first specification, we include the whole sample period and examine the difference between 
the 2007-09 financial crisis in relation to the remaining period. In the second specification, 
we include only the time after 2003 to consider the most recent boom and crisis cycle. The 
dependent variable is the difference in CARs between banks and matched non-banks. 2007-
09 financial crisis is an indicator variable, which equals 1 for the years from 2007 to 2009, 
and 0 otherwise. We find that the parameter coefficient of the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
variable is significantly negative (-2.586), indicating that the difference in CARs between 
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banks and non-banks decreases during the 2007-09 financial crisis period. This result 
confirms our second hypothesis that bank SEOs during the financial crisis seem to have sent 
a signal to market participants that the banks’ condition had deteriorated, and therefore 
investors reacted negatively to banks’ SEO announcements.13  
In addition, we explore the impact of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010 on the difference in SEO announcement 
effects between banks and non-banks. The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act introduced more 
stringent regulation on capital adequacy and information disclosure, as well as consumer 
protection, which may have led to a decreased level of adverse selection costs for financial 
institutions’ security sales. The hypothesis is that the reduced information asymmetry may 
have increased the announcement effects for bank SEOs, which would result in an increase in 
the difference in CARs between banks and non-banks. We test this hypothesis by examining 
the difference in CARs between banks and matched non-bank samples three years before and 
after 2010. Dodd-Frank is an indicator variable which equals 1 for the time period from 2010 
to 2012, and 0 otherwise. Column (3) of Table 4 shows that the parameter coefficient of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is significantly positive (5.962 and significant at the 5% level), showing that 
the reduced information asymmetry increased the announcement effects for bank SEOs. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines whether the announcement effect of seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs) by commercial banks differs from that of non-banks. We find that banks experience 
less negative announcement stock returns than non-banks when issuing equity. The difference 
                                                          
13
 Note that we exclude control variables in this DiD analysis, since they have already been considered in the 
propensity score matching analysis. In untabulated results, we include all control variables and find that all of 
them are insignificant, while our main conclusion holds regarding the main parameter coefficient on the 
financial crisis.   
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in the cumulative stock returns associated with equity offered by banks is 0.61 percent higher 
than that issued by non-banks. Bank regulations limit bank behavior, demand sufficient 
capital, and provide support under the implicit too-big-to-fail policy. Market participants are 
therefore less likely to associate bank SEO announcements with bank overvaluation as they 
do for the non-bank SEOs. Our difference-in-difference analysis further shows that the 
difference in abnormal stock returns between banks and non-banks decreases during the 
2007-09 global financial crisis period and increases after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in 2010. We should, however, be cautious to interpret this last result because the impact of 
the Dodd-Frank Act also clashes with the implementation of Basel III during the same period. 
Our results overall highlight the significance of recent regulation on the wealth 
announcement effect of bank SEOs.  
Our paper shed light on the debate over the impact of bank regulation on systemic risk 
and bank behavior. Our evidence that bank regulation may lead to lower information 
asymmetry between banks and investors by restricting banks’ risk taking and encouraging 
information disclosure has extensive implications for policy makers. On the other hand, 
although banks may face high level of compliance cost, the reduced information asymmetry 
may also help them to achieve lower borrowing cost in the financial market.   
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Table 1  
Summary statistics  
This table shows the summary statistics. Panel A reports the number of observations for both banks and non-
banks for each year across the sample period. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics and t-test for the 
cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) and firm-specific, issue-specific and macroeconomic variables for 
banks and non-bank firms over the sample period. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. Student’s t-test is 
used to examine the differences in the mean value of CAR and each firm-, issue-, and market-specific 
characteristic between banks and non-bank firms. Total assets are in billions of US dollars. N denotes the 
number of observations. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Yearly number of observations 
Year Banks Non-banks Year Banks Non-banks 
1982 3 61 1998 16 80 
1983 3 150 1999 4 84 
1984 3 28 2000 6 87 
1985 3 37 2001 17 228 
1986 4 53 2002 12 211 
1987 4 52 2003 21 231 
1988 2 30 2004 20 275 
1989 0 32 2005 16 189 
1990 1 36 2006 15 176 
1991 9 109 2007 10 121 
1992 8 68 2008 13 71 
1993 14 121 2009 59 138 
1994 2 99 2010 45 85 
1995 10 134 2011 25 61 
1996 12 145 2012 10 65 
1997 8 131 Total 375 3388 
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Panel B: Variable statistics 
  Banks Non-banks Mean of 
Panel 1 vs 
mean of 
Panel 2 
Median of 
Panel 1 vs 
median of 
Panel 2 Variable N Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max N Mean Std.dev. Median Min Max 
CAR, % 375 -0.98 4.45 -0.71 -12.77 9.67 3388 -1.59 4.86 -1.62 -13.35 9.71 0.61*** 0.90 
Secondary 375 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.51 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.21*** -1.00 
Rule 415 shelf 375 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.06** 0.00 
Share turnover 375 4.90 8.95 1.40 0.00 50.19 3388 6.62 10.74 2.06 0.00 50.19 -1.73*** -0.65 
Total assets 375 32.58 142.04 3.47 0.03 1309.6 3388 2.16 19.76 0.26 0.00 797.77 1.15*** 0.09 
Proceeds/total assets 375 3.07 7.82 1.18 0.10 93.08 3388 26.39 32.26 15.31 0.10 173.20 -23.32*** -14.13 
Equity/total assets 375 11.78 9.65 9.61 -2.16 73.48 3388 55.39 25.31 56.66 -35.11 93.96 -43.61*** -47.05 
Stock run-up 375 9.39 22.33 6.74 -41.23 92.17 3388 14.08 26.42 11.45 -41.23 92.17 -4.69*** -4.71 
Stock volatility 375 52.08 34.41 40.45 15.95 164.60 3388 58.05 28.75 52.20 15.95 164.60 -5.97*** -11.75 
Market volatility 375 19.01 9.95 16.78 7.75 45.64 3388 16.04 7.43 13.88 7.75 45.64 2.97*** 2.90 
Market run-up 375 4.15 6.91 4.63 -12.72 16.64 3388 3.48 6.30 3.74 -12.72 16.64 0.67** 0.89 
2007-09 financial crisis 375 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.12*** 0.00 
Firm commitment 375 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.52 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05*** 0.00 
Capital expenditure 375 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3388 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.08*** 0.00 
Inverse elasticity 375 1.33 1.53 1.16 -1.65 5.44 3334 1.18 1.71 1.00 -1.65 5.44 0.16*** 0.16 
Arbitrage risk 373 11.00 1.06 10.85 8.99 13.87 3387 11.44 0.95 11.46 8.99 13.87 -0.44*** -0.61 
Bid-ask spread 347 1.80 2.10 1.17 0.06 9.59 3123 2.00 2.15 1.29 0.06 9.59 -0.19* -0.12 
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Table 2 
SEO announcement stock returns for banks  
This table shows the results of the OLS regression analysis of the difference in cumulative abnormal stock returns of 
SEOs between banks and non-banks, controlling for firm-specific, issue-specific and market-specific measures. The 
interval period used is between -250 to -10 days (day 0 = SEO announcement) for the estimation. The dependent 
variable is cumulative abnormal stock returns (%) over the interval period (-1, 1 days), as calculated using the market 
model. Bank is a dummy variable for commercial banks. All other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1. P-
values are estimated using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and are shown in parentheses. N 
denotes the number of observations. *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bank 0.617** 0.643** 0.612** 0.647** 0.703** 0.647** 
(0.034) (0.027) (0.036) (0.026) (0.019) (0.027) 
Secondary 0.918*** 0.862*** 0.885*** 0.816*** 0.842*** 0.850*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule 415 shelf 0.602*** 0.660*** 0.962*** 0.671*** 0.738*** 0.667*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Share turnover 0.020** 0.020** 0.019** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) 
Size 0.123** 0.128** 0.139** 0.129** 0.104 0.113* 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.017) (0.025) (0.101) (0.086) 
Proceeds/total assets -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.202) (0.205) (0.202) (0.229) (0.191) (0.195) 
Equity/total assets 0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007** 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) (0.063) (0.050) 
Stock run-up -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock volatility -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.009 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.248) 
Market volatility -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
(0.401) (0.952) (0.953) (0.988) (0.960) (0.918) 
Market run-up 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
2007-09 financial crisis -0.626** -0.619** -0.607** -0.660** -0.633** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.029) (0.019) (0.023) 
Firm commitment 0.398 
(0.110) 
Capital expenditure -0.146 
(0.584) 
Inverse elasticity -0.067 
(0.218) 
Arbitrage risk -0.129 
(0.592) 
Constant -2.432*** -2.566*** -2.967*** -2.549*** -2.369*** -1.201 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) 
N 3763 3763 3763 3763 3709 3760 
Adj. R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.039 
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Table 3 
Matched sample results 
This table shows the propensity score matching with the nearest neighbour of non-banks to compare cumulative 
abnormal stock returns in the interval period between -1 and 1 days for banks and non-banks. Panel A reports the probit 
model results, where the dependent variable is a bank dummy, and Panel B the difference in the cumulative abnormal 
stock returns between banks and matched non-banks. All explanatory variables are defined in Appendix 1. N denotes 
the number of observations. * and *** represent 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Probit model results 
 
Coefficients Standard errors 
 
Proceeds ratio 0.016*** 0.016 
Stock run-up 0.005 0.005 
Stock volatility 0.004 0.004 
Market volatility 0.014* 0.014 
Market run-up 0.017*** 0.017 
Secondary 0.400*** 0.400 
Rule415 shelf 0.305* 0.305 
    
N 6332 
  
Pseudo R-square 21.30% 
  
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs)  
Nearest neighbour matching Banks Non-banks Difference 
CAR(-1,1) -0.150*** -1.680*** 1.530*** 
N 166 166 
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Table 4 
The impact of the 2007-09 financial crisis and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act  
This table shows the propensity score matching-based pairwise difference-in-difference analysis of the impact of the 
2007-09 financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 on the difference in cumulative abnormal stock 
returns in the interval period (-1, 1 days) for banks and non-banks. The dependent variable is the difference in CARs 
between banks and matched non-banks using the propensity score matching approach. 2007-09 financial crisis is a 
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the year is between 2007 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. Dodd-Frank Act is a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the year is 2010 or later, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) includes the entire sample from 1982 
to 2012, column (2) the period from 2004 to 2012, and column (3) from 2007 to 2012. N denotes the number of 
observations. P-values are estimated using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and are shown in 
parentheses. ** and *** represent 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
2007-09 financial crisis -2.586** -3.118** 
(0.040) (0.046) 
Dodd-Frank Act 5.962** 
(0.021) 
Constant 2.060*** 2.592** -0.526 
(0.000) (0.014) (0.650) 
N 166 80 47 
Adj. R-squared 0.023 0.037 0.110 
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Figure 1 
Cumulative abnormal announcement stock returns (-1,1 days) of SEOs for banks versus non-banks 
during the sample period 
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Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Variable Classification Definition 
Bank Firm-specific 1 for banks, 0 otherwise 
Secondary  Issue-specific 1 for shares being sold by existing shareholders, 0 otherwise 
Rule 415 shelf Issue-specific 1 if equity offering was shelf registered, 0 otherwise 
Share turnover Firm-specific Trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding 
Size Firm-specific Natural logarithm of total assets denominated in US dollars 
Proceeds/total assets Issue-specific Relative size of the equity offering, calculated as the offering proceeds divided by total assets 
Equity/total assets Firm-specific Total equity divided by total assets 
Stock run-up Firm-specific Stock return over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date 
Stock volatility Firm-specific Annualized stock return volatility, calculated from daily stock returns over the window (-250,-10) relative to the equity 
announcement date 
Market volatility Market-specific Annualized market return volatility, calculated from daily returns on the S&P 500 index over the window (-240,-40) 
relative to the equity announcement date 
Market run-up Market-specific Stock market returns on S&P 500 index over the window (-60,-2) relative to the announcement date 
2007-09 financial crisis Market-specific 1 for equity issued during years 2007 to 2009, 0 otherwise 
Firm commitment Issue-specific 1 if the equity is issued as firm commitment, 0 otherwise 
Capital expenditure Firm-specific 1 if the intended use of proceeds is a capital expenditure, 0 otherwise  
Inverse elasticity Issue-specific The natural log transformation of the absolute value of the daily raw return divided by the daily turnover, averaged over 
250 trading days before the announcement date 
Arbitrage risk Issue-specific The residual variance, expressed as a squared percentage of the market model OLS regression residual, estimated over the 
250 trading days before the announcement date 
 
